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lawyers involved in academic or forensic research on monopoly
control/corporate power related issues.
The authors have performed another important service with
this volume. They have taken on the Chicago School at the "street
economics" level, in a way that is readily accessible to students,
faculty, professionals, and policymakers. This makes this volume a
direct challenge to the Chicago School writers in those markets for
ideas, in and out of academia, where they have been the most
fashionable over the course ofthe last few years.
The shelves are full of books and other works by the titans of
the new learning (Bork, Posner, Becker, Baumol, Baxter et al., and
their satellites), many of whom write at a level accessible tot he intelligent layperson, compared to the Chicago School's offensive in
the areas of legal and economic literature, the courts, and
academia, those with opposing views have been noticeably less
energetic. This volume is doubly welcome for its ease of approach
to a complex topic, and for the fact that it is directly confrontational.
For classroom use, this book would be an excellent choice at the
upper division or graduate level, since it is relatively short,
presents both sides well, is lively, and is analytical and policy
oriented. It would be perfect for use in economics, business law,
and other law classes where these issues are alive and vibrant; the
footnotes bristle with paper topics, and there are references and
citations enough to get every paper off to a good start.
this is an excellent and timely addition to the literature on the
control of monopoly power. I highly recommend it.
MICHAEL F. SHEEHAN

Fisher, Sheehan & Colton
Scappoose, Oregon

EISENHOWER AND THE MANAGEMENT OF PROSPERITY.
By John W. Sloan. Lawrence, Kans.: University of Kansas Press,
1991. Pp. 191. $25.00 (cloth).
Twenty-five years ago, Dwight Eisenhower was often depicted
as a president with no great competence nor interest in economics
or domestic policy issues. However, as those interested in
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presidential studies know, Eisenhower has been posthumously
rehabilitated.
The revisionist literature on Eisenhower is now becoming complete, and John Sloan's book Eisenhower and the Management of
Prosperity reflects this revisionism by examining economic policy
formation in the 1950s. In Sloan's book, we see an Eisenhower
who was not only competent in economics, but was also very
aware ofthe political ramifications of economic policy. We also see
in Eisenhower's leadership style a politically astute president who
was actively involved in shaping policy. In painting this picture,
Sloan provides a cogent, concise survey of economic policy formation in the 1950s.
Sloan frames this discussion of macroeconomic policy in the
Eisenhower years by examining the president's ideology, his advisors, the institutions involved in policy formation and development, and the cultural environment. In so doing, he correctly
points out how multiple factors affect policy formation and
demonstrates how even Eisenhower, that "rock of fiscal probity,"
changed through time. He examines the way in which the newly
created Council of Economic Advisors was professionalized with
the appointment of Arthur Bums, and how the Federal Reserve
was allowed to assume its premier position in the fight against inflation.
As the first Republican president since Hoover, Eisenhower
was fearful of being associated with economic decline, and he was
careful to assure the public that he would act promptly to restore
full employment should circumstances call for intervention. Sloan
points out that even before his inauguration, Eisenhower told
George Hauge, assistant for economic affairs, to "work on the
federal highway program and suggested that 'the timing of construction should be such as to have some effect in leveling out
peaks and valleys in our economic life'" [p. 134]. Moreover, as the
first recession of his administration wore on, Sloan reports that
Eisenhower told his cabinet, "We've got to have good
economics . . . everything possible must be done to bring about a
rapid recovery in order to avoid the fate of Hoover" [p. 140]. Although a fortuitous tax cut helped to curtail the 1954 recession,
and Eisenhower was not prompted to engage in discretionary
stabilization policies, he nonetheless issued a directive to stimulate the economy by speeding up the spending of monies already
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appropriated. As Sloan reports, Eisenhower told agencies "Arthur's
policy-if you have approp.-spend it" [p. 140].
While Eisenhower may have heeded Arthur Bums's advice
during the 1954 recession, in the late 1950s, Bums's advice to
stimulate the economy was rejected as Eisenhower became less
sensitive to short-term political implications of his policy decisions.
According to Sloan, during the 1958 recession, Eisenhower rejected
the advice of Burns, Richard Nixon, and others who called for a tax
cut to stimulate the economy. More importantly for Nixon, as the
1960 election approached, Eisenhower again rejected the calls for a
more expansionary fiscal policy and chose instead to pursue fiscal
policies aimed at balancing the budget rather than promoting
economic growth and low unemployment.
What is perhaps most valuable about this book, however, is the
way in which Sloan reminds us that, as is true in so many other
areas, economic policy was greatly influenced by the Cold War in
the 1950s and cannot be understood apart from it. According to
Sloan, Eisenhower was firmly convinced that economic prosperity
was vital to national security and, for Eisenhower, economic
prosperity was intimately related to balanced budgets and low inflation. What is less well known is the degree to which Eisenhower
viewed many domestic welfare programs to be related to defense
as well. Not only was the interstate highway system a defense imperative, but increased expenditures for education and other social
programs were viewed in defense terms as well. Sloan shows that
while the Cold War permeated public policy discussion in the
Eisenhower White House, Eisenhower was well aware that higher
defense spending did not necessarily translate into increased national security. According to Sloan, it was in the area of defense expenditures that Eisenhower was most criticized and historically
most vindicated [p. 98].
While there is much to like about this book, a lack of critical
perspective on the Eisenhower years contributes to some errors of
interpretation. For example, Sloan argues that in the late 1950s,
John F. Kennedy was able to convince the American people that
the economy was stagnating when, according to Sloan, "the United
States was doing well" [p. 61]. Moreover, Sloan argues that, as the
decade of the 1950s progressed, "the Democrats held the Eisenhower administration to ever higher standards of performance" [p.
68]. Sloan seems not to appreciate the upward drift in unemployment that accompanied the push to balance the budget in the late
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1950s-a situation that prompted Lyndon Johnson to argue that
the Eisenhower years were a period when "the rich get richer and
the poor are expected to balance the budget."
This is a generous and sympathetic treatment of Eisenhower.
Sloan dismisses Eisenhower's failure to provide leadership in civil
rights and social welfare, consistently refers to Democrats who
broke even moderately from the Eisenhower conservatism as
"liberals," and praises Eisenhower's attempts to balance the
budget. In spite of this conservative bias, the book helps us begin
to explore the extent to which the domestic policy agenda and the
parameters for governmental stabilization policies were established in the 1950s. In that decade, stabilization policy was a contested terrain, and it was Eisenhower who helped to establish the
domestic perspective on inflation, unemployment, and the role of
government in addressing these economic problems. Eisenhower
reintroduced the budget deficit as a central notion in the debate
over economic policy and reasserted the priority of low inflation.
Most importantly, he shifted the responsibility for inflation away
from the private sector to the govemment. In this sense,
Eisenhower's infiuence was preeminent among postwar presidents, and the 1950s remains a pivotal decade in macroeconomic
policy formation and public opinion. Those interested in understanding the current stalemate in macroeconomic policy will find
much of use in this discussion, although the full significance of the
development of economic policy in the 1950s remains, in part, unexplored.
ANNMARIMAY

University of Nebraska-Lincoln

MORALITY, RATIONALITY, AND EFFICIENCY: NEW. PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIO-ECONOMICS. Edited by Richard M.
Coughlin. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1991. Pp. xii, 411.
$45.00 (hardcover), $17.95 (paperback).
Since the publication of Amitai Etzioni's The Moral Dimension
in 1988, his "socioeconomics" has been among the most prominent
challengers to neoclassical orthodoxy. It also presents a potential
dilemma to institutional and evolutionary economists: Will it advance their efforts by providing a progressive, critical program

